Mediating the Margins: the role of brokers and the Eastern Provincial Councils in Sri Lanka’s post war transition by Goodhand, Jonathan et al.
This is the accepted version of Jonathan Goodhand, Bart Klem & Oliver Walton (2017) ‘Mediating the margins: the role 
of brokers and the Eastern Provincial Councils in Sri Lanka’s post-war transition’ Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal. 
Published version available from Taylor & Francis at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23802014.2016.1302816 
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23788/   
 
1 
 
Prof. Jonathan Goodhand, SOAS University of London, London WC1H 0XG (corresponding author), 
jg27@soas.ac.uk  
Dr. Bart Klem, University of Melbourne, Parkville VIC 3010, Australia 
bart.klem@unimelb.edu.au  
Dr. Oliver Walton, University of Bath, Claverton Down, Bath BA2 7AY 
o.e.walton@bath.ac.uk  
 
Mediating the margins: the role of brokers and the Eastern Provincial Councils in Sri 
Lanka’s post-war transition 
Notes on contributors 
Jonathan Goodhand is a Professor in Conflict and Development Studies at the School of 
Oriental and African Studies, London. His research interests include the political economy of 
aid and conflict, NGOs and peacebuilding and „post conflict‟ reconstruction. Recent 
publications include „Checkpoint, Temple, Church and Mosque: A Collaborative 
Ethnography of War and Peace in Eastern Sri Lanka‟ (with J. Spencer, S. Hasbullah, B. 
Klem, B. Korf and T. Silva, Pluto 2014) and „The Afghan Conundrum: Intervention, 
Statebuilding and Resistance‟ (with M. Sedra, Routledge 2015). He currently leads two 
research projects „Borderlands, Brokers and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka and Nepal: War to 
Peace Transitions viewed from the Margins‟ (2015-17, ESRC) and „State Frontier and 
Conflict in the Asia Pacific (2014-18, University of Melbourne-SOAS). 
Bart Klem is a Lecturer in Development Policy at the University of Melbourne. His research 
focuses on the inter-connections between development and violent conflict. More 
specifically, he is interested in development processes, aid, politics, de facto sovereignty and 
This is the accepted version of Jonathan Goodhand, Bart Klem & Oliver Walton (2017) ‘Mediating the margins: the role 
of brokers and the Eastern Provincial Councils in Sri Lanka’s post-war transition’ Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal. 
Published version available from Taylor & Francis at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23802014.2016.1302816 
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23788/   
 
2 
 
public authority in (violently) contested environments and transitional contexts. Recent 
publications include „Showing One's Colours: The political work of elections in post-war Sri 
Lanka‟ (Modern Asian Studies, 2015), „Constructing Legitimacy in Post-War Transition: The 
Return of „Normal‟ Politics in Nepal and Sri Lanka?‟ (with S. Byrne, Geoforum, 2015), and 
„Checkpoint, Temple, Church and Mosque: A Collaborative Ethnography of War and Peace 
in Eastern Sri Lanka‟ (with J. Spencer, J. Goodhand, S. Hasbullah, B. Korf and T. Silva, 
Pluto 2014). He is an investigator on two on-going research projects „State Frontier and 
Conflict in the Asia Pacific‟ (2014-18, University of Melbourne). 
Oliver Walton is a Lecturer in International Development at the University of Bath. His 
research focuses on the ways in which NGOs and civil society organisations generate and 
maintain legitimacy, and on the political implications of NGOs‟ engagement in 
peacebuilding. He has also conducted research on liberal peacebuilding, third-party 
mediation, and conflict prevention. Recent publications include „Understanding 
Contemporary Challenges to INGO Legitimacy: Integrating Top-Down and Bottom-Up 
Perspectives‟, (with T. Davies, E. Thrandardottir, V. Keating, Voluntas), “Framing Disputes 
and Organizational Legitimation: UK-based Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora Groups‟ use of the 
„genocide‟ frame since 2009”, (Ethnic and Racial Studies, 2015), „Learning Lessons or 
Unearthing Truths? Using Evidence to Inform Mediation Policy‟, (Civil Wars, 2014). He is 
co-investigator on the ESRC-funded project „Borderlands, Brokers and Peacebuilding in Sri 
Lanka and Nepal: War to Peace Transitions viewed from the Margins‟ (2015-17). 
Acknowledgements 
The authors gratefully acknowledge all their research participants and collaborators. In 
particular they would like to thank Shahul Hasbullah, Benedikt Korf, Tudor Silva and 
This is the accepted version of Jonathan Goodhand, Bart Klem & Oliver Walton (2017) ‘Mediating the margins: the role 
of brokers and the Eastern Provincial Councils in Sri Lanka’s post-war transition’ Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal. 
Published version available from Taylor & Francis at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23802014.2016.1302816 
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23788/   
 
3 
 
Jonathan Spencer for the collaborative research, which has informed this article. The research 
by Goodhand and Walton was supported by two projects funded by Economic and Social 
Research Council (ESRC): „Conflict, Community and Faith: The Politics of Public Action in 
Sri Lanka‟ and „Borderlands, Brokers and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka and Nepal: War to 
Peace Transitions viewed from the margins‟ (grant numbers RES-155-25-0096 and 
ES/M011046/1). Klem‟s research was conducted with funding from the Swiss National 
Science Foundation: „Living with violence II: the struggle for territory in post-war Sri Lanka‟ 
(SNF; grant numbers PDFMP1-123181/1 and 100017_149183). 
Abstract 
This article explores the political dynamics surrounding the Eastern Provincial Council 
during Sri Lanka’s post-war transition. We show that decentralisation constituted an 
intervention in conflict, rather than a solution to it. It creates new institutional arenas to re-
negotiate centre-periphery relations, resulting in new forms of political mobilisation. There 
are crucial spatial dimensions to these contentions: it involves contested territorialisation of 
power, scalar manoeuvring, and boundary drawing. These are explored in Sri Lanka’s 
Eastern Province, with particular reference to the role performed by brokers in mediating 
centre-periphery relations, through and alongside the Provincial Council.  
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1. Introduction 
It was a blistering hot afternoon in Batticaloa, eastern Sri Lanka in mid-2008. Whilst most 
people were taking a post rice and curry siesta in this sleepy coastal town, one of the authors 
(Goodhand) and his research assistant were trudging through the heat to the „kachcheri‟ 
(government secretariat) for an interview. The only sounds were the drone of the cicadas and 
a group of schoolboys playing cricket on a dusty patch of grass nearby. Then from the 
distance we heard the wailing of approaching sirens, followed in seconds by a cavalcade of 
vehicles going at great speed. There was barely time to get out of the way and catch a fleeting 
glimpse of two military jeeps escorting a black Land Cruiser with tinted windows. It 
transpired that the cavalcade was escorting a local figure, someone who six years before had 
been a cadre of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), fighting against the Sri Lankan 
government. His nom de guerre was Pillayan (his real name, Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan) 
and his fortunes had changed dramatically after the 2002 ceasefire. Following a sequence of 
rebel splits, internecine fighting and the government driving the LTTE out of the east, 
Pillayan was elected as Chief Minister of the Eastern Province. He was at the height of his 
powers when we saw him speeding through Batticaloa. But his meteoric rise was to be 
followed by an equally dramatic fall from grace. He lost the 2012 elections, became an 
embarrassment to the government, and was eventually arrested on charges of murder. 
Although Pillayan‟s rise and fall was a sudden one, it is not atypical of the shifts in power 
and fortunes that frequently accompany, and are features of, contested post-war transitions. 
His trajectory captures an important dynamic, in which power can oscillate back and forth 
between centre and periphery; the battles for authority, positions and resources can be at their 
most intense and deadly on the margins of the state. Historically in Sri Lanka, violent 
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challenges to the state emerged from the periphery, contributing in turn to central 
government‟s anxiety about asserting its presence in these zones. In light of this tension, the 
politics around decentralised government has always been a key arena of contestation, which 
is explored below in relation to Sri Lanka‟s Provincial Council system. Far from being a 
technical solution to the „ethnic problem‟ – a means of dispersing power and democratizing 
the state – we argue that local government has been a lightening rod for local, national and 
international interests and insecurities and as a result has added new layers of complexity to a 
protracted conflict. As Pillayan‟s career also shows, an analysis that takes for granted the 
binary divisions between the national and local, formal and informal, state and non-state is 
deficient; brokers tend to dissolve or transgress such boundaries and categories, exploiting 
the points of friction between them, so as to direct or filter the flow of power and resources. 
Successful brokers – which Pillayan, in the long term, evidently was not – are able to manage 
and keep in tension contending sets of pressures that emanate from the state at the centre and 
their constituencies in the periphery.  
In section 2, we highlight how a stronger focus on space, territory and brokerage can add to 
and deepen the insights yielded by this research. Section 3 provides some basic background 
on Sri Lanka‟s conflict, devolution, and the Eastern Provincial Council. Our empirical 
analysis then consists of two parts. In section 4, we examine the institutional politics of the 
Eastern Provincial Council during the post-war period (2007-2015). In section 5, we provide 
three illustrative accounts of brokers to explore the informal networks of power that 
underpinned and shaped the formal institutions of local government. We finish with a set of 
conclusions. 
The empirical analysis draws upon a combination of the authors‟ long term experience of 
research in the east since the 1990s (Goodhand) and 2000s (Klem and Walton). Specifically it 
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draws upon a sequence of field visits conducted in the east in the period 2006-2016. This 
research involved the systematic tracing of key players in east Sri Lanka‟s political landscape 
over time (complemented with key informant interviews and observations to capture common 
perceptions about these players) and detailed accounts of key turning points or moments of 
rupture, including elections, military victories and political ruptures.  
 
2. Bringing the margins back in: decentralisation, space and power 
Much of the policy literature on local government and conflict explores whether 
decentralisation is an effective tool for resolving conflict in divided, post-war societies. The 
debates about constitutional design can broadly be divided into an integrationist position, 
which argues for strong centralised state institutions in order to override or contain 
centrifugal tendencies, and an accommodationist position, which argues for political and 
legal institutions that reflect the divisions of post-war societies, though power sharing 
arrangements involving the devolution of power or a federal system.
1
  
This article aims to go beyond technical questions of constitutional design, to explore how 
processes of post-war state reform and decentralisation create new arenas of contestation, 
onto which competing international and domestic political narratives can be projected. This 
more complex reading of decentralisation processes is supported by existing case study 
research and other papers in this special issue. Four key points stand out in relation to Sri 
Lankan case. 
First, the democratising and peacebuilding potential of decentralisation efforts are shaped and 
constrained by local elites and patronage networks.
2
 Whilst post-war political settlements and 
elite pacts may undermine democracy, they may in fact be stabilizing if they lead to new, and 
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sufficiently inclusive rent-sharing agreements.
3
 Second, decentralisation efforts often produce 
unforeseen and unintended effects. They may fail to achieve their ostensible goals because 
they run counter to the interests of central state and peripheral elites, but they may also lead 
to new forms of political mobilisation and claim making. Third, the stated goals of 
decentralisation efforts frequently cloak competing sets of ambitions and interests. One key 
tension is between deconcentration and devolution, the former referring to administrative 
decentralisation and the latter to political decentralisation.
4
 Fourth, decentralisation schemes 
have important discursive and symbolic value. They may be strategically framed by the state 
or international donors to signal commitment to peace, or to discredit „uncooperative‟ and 
unruly local actors. As explored below, decentralisation may be presented as a conflict 
resolution mechanism, whilst in fact supporting a process of one-sided state consolidation. 
Analytically, decentralisation policies are often premised on what Ferguson and Gupta have 
called a „vertical topography of power‟, the erroneous assumption that the state floats in a 
relatively abstract form above society, thus exaggerating its spatial reach and vertical height.
5
 
This reification of the state is based upon simplistic binaries between state and non-state, 
public and private, national and local. Political economists, anthropologists and geographers 
question the notion of the state as a fixed object or as a finished product. They usefully de-
construct and denaturalise the idea of the state as a coherent and rational entity, seeing it as 
something that is always in the making, blurring binary distinctions and highlighting the 
networks, coalitions and material foundations that underpin or undermine the state.
6
 A 
growing focus on institutional hybridity or „twilight institutions‟7 explores how political 
authority is built from below through complex amalgams of state and non-state institutions, 
practices and actors. 
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Analyses of local government tend to focus on scale, but strangely neglect space – strange 
because local government is explicitly a technology of spatial ordering. We believe that the 
political dynamics surrounding local government institutions located at the centre such as 
municipal councils in Colombo are likely to be very different to those facing local 
government institutions at the margins of the state. Therefore, there is a need for a more 
nuanced examination of local governance that exposes the complex political topography of 
the state and the uneven processes of rule and development that unfold within and across the 
territory of the state.
8
 We seek to do this by bringing together an analysis of space, scale and 
networks.
9
 By doing so we work with ideas related to the politics and the meanings of place 
and the importance of boundaries which delimit and divide space and territory. This means 
exploring how place-making and boundary drawing are simultaneously linked to governance 
processes at the global, national and local levels; and how flows of resources and ideas, 
mediated through networks and brokers, tie together these different scales and spaces.
10
 
Our analysis draws upon a literature that has focused on questions to do with space and 
power and the role that the state‟s margins play in negotiating and constituting power at the 
centre.
11
 These marginal zones are neither „governance vacuums‟ nor disconnected from 
circuits of capital and power at the national and transnational levels, but they have unique 
features in terms of how they are related to the putative centres of authority and capital 
accumulation.  
Some peripheries are conceived of as frontier regions: fuzzy zones of transition between 
different centres and registers of power, which are represented as „empty spaces‟ that need to 
be pacified and incorporated into the civilizing project of the state.
12
 State expansion and 
market penetration are associated with the closure of frontier spaces, whilst extended conflict 
and the retreat of the state may be associated with the re-opening of frontiers. Frontier 
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dynamics – and associated notions of centre and periphery – are liable to shift during wartime 
and post-war transitions. Power is spatialized in complex ways and states seek to govern the 
margins by transcending old boundaries and creating new ones. Conversely non-state 
authorities may seek to draw different boundaries, linked to enduring linguistic, ethnic or 
religious identities. Therefore local government boundaries intersect with and overlay a 
complex cartography of power and identity.  
The margins of the state are typically sites of institutional plurality and patchiness, and as a 
result actors located at the political or economic centre will often rely on intermediaries or 
brokers to mobilise political support or to access markets and capital in these peripheral 
zones. Such brokers may constitute simultaneously the connective tissue and point of friction 
between centre and periphery. As Eric Wolf noted, they „stand guard over the critical 
junctures or synapses of relationships which connect the local system to the larger whole‟.13 
They are often powerful yet vulnerable figures who shape how power is imposed and 
resisted, and struggle to survive by „maintaining the tensions which provide the dynamic of 
their actions‟.14  
Post-war transitions can be understood as moments of rupture or „revelatory crises‟ when 
„opportunities and risks multiply, when the scope of outcomes widens, and when new 
structural scaffolding is erected.‟15 Brokerage, in such situations, is likely to be rearranged 
along new lines of authority, alongside continuities with former alliance-building strategies.
16
 
The location and functions of brokers during these moments of rupture varies. Some, such as 
the example of Abdullah explored below, can be viewed as „embedded brokers‟, deeply 
rooted in peripheral communities who perform a gatekeeping role. Others, such as the case of 
Punchinalame, are „representative brokers‟, whose capacity to broker is founded on their 
strong ties to the central state.
17
  And some, such as Pillayan, may start off as the former and 
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then end up as the latter, as they increasingly get pulled into the orbit of the central state. 
Brokers, then, occupy a complex and fluid political landscape – they may successively or 
simultaneously be mediators of coercive, political or economic resources, and their position 
in relation to the central state can oscillate between „exit‟, „voice‟ and „loyalty‟.18 The 
outcomes of brokers‟ activities are characteristically ambiguous. They can both facilitate the 
extension of the central state‟s political or economic claims on the margins (as shown through 
the cases of Pillayan and Punchinalame), whilst also providing a focal point for the 
periphery‟s claims on the state (as in the case of Abdullah).  
The relationship between the central state and the periphery is typically transformed by war. 
The margins of the state often serve as incubators of grievance and are central to the 
dynamics of war and peace. The edges of the state may become critical sites of institutional 
and socioeconomic innovation with new forms of political authority and new sources of 
capital accumulation and investment emerging from the periphery.
19
 In post-war contexts, 
troublesome frontier regions are often zones subjected to projects of stabilisation and 
pacification by the centre and become key sites of contestation between competing visions of 
development, peace and security. These frontier zones may also be sites of experimentation 
in which the central state trials new forms of policing, surveillance and militarized 
development, which are then redeployed at the centre in order to consolidate social control 
and centralise power. 
 
3. Towards a new political settlement? Sri Lanka’s Provincial Council System 
Figure 1, below, shows the dualistic system of deconcentrated government, which takes the 
form of secretariats at the district and town level that are agents of the central state, coupled 
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with weak devolved government in the form of the PCs and Local Authorities (Pradeshiya 
Sabhas, Municipal/Urban Councils).  
FIGURE 1 HERE 
Sri Lanka‟s northeastern Dry Zone has played a salient political role in the island‟s history. 
Unlike the rest of the country, the region is predominantly inhabited by the Tamil and Muslin 
minority, and became central to the discursive and material reproduction of the post-colonial 
state. It became a frontier of demographic expansion for the land poor peasantry in the wet 
zone; a civilizational frontier occupied by the Tamil „other‟ which helped promote a sense of 
nationhood amongst the Sinhala majority; a frontier of accumulation as a result of investment 
in settlement projects which brought „barren‟ lands under cultivation. These frontier 
dynamics fuelled the Tamil separatist agenda. In the 1980s, contentious politics escalated into 
full-blown war and this heightened the intensity of, and contradictions between these 
centripetal and centrifugal forces. On the one hand the war in the northeast created a process 
of de facto decentralisation, as new forms of insurgent governance limited the reach and 
authority of the central state.
20
 At the same time, in response to the conflict the state became 
more militarized and more centralised, with greater power flowing to the executive due to the 
state of emergency. 
It is in this context that the Provincial Council (PC) system was introduced. The councils 
were established as a result of the Indo-Lanka Accord of 1987. The Accord, the product of 
strong Indian pressure, was an attempt to resolve the conflict through power sharing 
arrangements. India‟s „solution‟, the PC system, was seen as a compromise: it preserved the 
unitary state, stopping well short of federalism, whilst providing the minority communities 
with a level of regional autonomy. 
This is the accepted version of Jonathan Goodhand, Bart Klem & Oliver Walton (2017) ‘Mediating the margins: the role 
of brokers and the Eastern Provincial Councils in Sri Lanka’s post-war transition’ Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal. 
Published version available from Taylor & Francis at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23802014.2016.1302816 
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23788/   
 
12 
 
The PCs were widely viewed as externally imposed and were never fully embraced by any of 
the major political parties in Sri Lanka.
21
 Although the Indo-Lanka Accord fulfilled one of 
the key demands of the Tamil groups -- the (temporary) merger of the Northern and Eastern 
Provinces into a single administrative unit – it fell well short of their maximalist position of a 
separate state, and the LTTE reneged on the agreement soon after.
22
 An ill-fated military 
intervention by India was followed by renewed and intensified warfare. The Provincial 
Council system, though it had few domestic supporters, endured. 
The Provincial Council system spatialized power in particular ways, creating a political 
geography that privileged certain levels, and certain administrative/electoral delineations over 
others.
23
 Firstly, the PC can be understood as a conscious intervention in the scalar politics of 
the conflict. Earlier government decentralisation schemes bypassed the provincial level and 
focused on the district level, as this this ensured state control over development resources at 
the grass roots, whilst undercutting Tamil efforts at wider ethno-linguistic mobilisation.
24
 
However, the Tamil polity, demanded what was essentially a federalist arrangement 
involving asymmetrical devolution and that recognized a Tamil Homeland (a spatial 
imaginary which saw the north and east as a contiguous block of Tamil speakers). In fact 
both positions were based on simplifications which sought to elide the complex social 
geography of the margins. The outcome was a deeply compromised one: a system based on 
provinces, i.e. a middle ground between the northeastern region and districts, but this was 
then subjected to a second compromise through the provisional merger of the Northern and 
Eastern Province.  
Secondly, the power and autonomy of the PCs was deliberately curtailed as the centre 
retained control over provincial finances, whilst administrative oversight was ensured 
through a governor appointed by the president. Key policy fields like control over land, 
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finance and law enforcement were placed on a so-called concurrent list: they were supposed 
to be jointly managed by centre and province, but effectively remained under control of the 
former. The powers of the PCs were further constrained by the highly centralised structure of 
the civil service, a conservative judiciary which tended to side with the centre, and with the 
entrenched nationalist ideology of the unitary state, which was deeply-rooted in the 
bureaucracy.
25
  
Thirdly, because of the above, the merged North Eastern Provincial Council (NEPC) 
functioned only in name. The council was appointed, rather than elected, and the governor (a 
presidential appointee) in effect became the only actor of any significance in the provincial 
legislative politics. Ironically, the only Sri Lankan PCs that actually functioned were the ones 
in the rest of the country, even though the system had been introduced to deal with the „ethnic 
conflict‟ in the northeast. This led to new political dynamics in the south. PCs provided 
spaces and openings for politicians at the centre to dispense positions and patronage.
26
 
Conversely they also provided an alternative channel for domestic political expression, and 
new and surprising alliances at the margins periodically de-stabilized incumbent 
governments. 
 
4. Wartime and post-war decentralisation politics in the east 
Our focus now turns to eastern Sri Lanka during the last years of the war and the subsequent 
post-war transition. We first look at the institutional architecture and politics that surrounded 
the Eastern Provincial Council. We then explore the manoeuvring of three contrasting 
brokers to show how the struggles around decentralisation are channelled not only through 
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the visible, formal structures of the EPC, but also through informal networks that may work 
in parallel to, or at odds with it. 
The institutional politics of the EPC   
During the war in the 1990s, the state‟s face in the region was largely a military one. The 
merged NEPC had no elected politicians; the minimal role that it had was played by the 
governor and civil servants. The war radically opened the entire northeast frontier, which 
became a zone of political experimentation. The LTTE established de facto state structures, 
and the outreach of the Sri Lankan state was heavily circumscribed by the war: older 
institutional forms like the civil service and electoral politics continued but under the shadow 
of new authorities and military rule.
27
 The east was the most volatile area throughout the war. 
It was the site of the breakdown of major ceasefires in 1990 and 2006. The war created a 
complex political geography, divided into „cleared‟ (government controlled) and „uncleared‟ 
(LTTE controlled) areas. Violence and insecurity led to the unmixing of populations, thus 
changing the complex mosaic of Tamil, Muslim and Sinhalese settlements along the east 
coast.
28
  
This political landscape was transformed after the 2002 ceasefire, which re-calibrated centre 
periphery and intra-periphery relations. Initially, at the national level, this translated into an 
historic convergence of the government‟s and LTTE entered peace talks, ‟s positions, 
manifest in the 2002 „Oslo declaration‟ in which both sides agreed to explore a political 
solution based upon a federal structure. However peace talks which soon broke down, leading 
to a volatile period of no war-no peace. A wide range of actors jockeyed for position, as new 
spaces for decentralised politics and nationalist contestation opened up and others closed. Old 
alliances and loyalties came under pressure, new networks and forms of collaboration 
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emerged. One manifestation of these shifts was the LTTE split and the tilting of the strategic 
balance in the government‟s favour. This contributed to resumed war in 2006 and then 
cumulated in the LTTE‟s defeat, first in the east (2007) and then finally in the north (2009). 
It was in the east where these changes first manifested themselves and in hindsight, it was the 
eastern margins (rather than the north) that played the constitutive role in ending the war and 
shaping the post-war political settlement. It was here that the splinter group of the LTTE, the 
so-called Karuna faction, emerged, which weakened the LTTE militarily and crucially 
undermined its claim to be the sole representative of the Tamils. The political party that 
emerged out of this faction, Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) started talking about 
„South Eelam‟ rather than Tamil Eelam – breaking the unity of the imaginary state into two 
pieces.
29
  
It is also in this period that the Provincial Councils were brought back into play. The merging 
of the Northern and Eastern Council – a compromise to the Eelamists when the system was 
created – was ruled unconstitutional in 2006. This resulted in the de-merging of the NEPC 
into a separate EPC and NPC, a change with major spatial and electoral significance: not only 
did it prevent the convergence of decentralised government with the claimed Tamil homeland 
in the northeast, it also improved government chances of ruling the periphery by proxy. With 
the strong Tamil majority in the north, the government had no hope of controlling the NPC, 
but the multi-ethnic Eastern Province would be much more vulnerable to divide-and-rule 
tactics. Moreover, the east was conquered first, thus creating a political testing ground for 
post-war decentralisation politics. 
After defeating the LTTE in the east, the government was able to exploit ambiguities in 
mainstream narratives about decentralisation and conflict by conflating two distinct agendas: 
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a peacebuilding narrative which focused on how the PCs support peace by providing 
autonomy and self-rule, and a statebuilding narrative that PCs could support a process of 
stabilization, state expansion and state consolidation in the Eastern Province, which had 
previously been partly under the control of the LTTE. This was operationalized through the 
„Nagenahira Navodaya‟ or Eastern Reawakening programme which included a range of 
reconstruction efforts, typically accompanied by a big sign displaying president Rajapaksa 
and representative brokers like Pillayan or Punchinilame (see below). 
The central state clearly prioritised the statebuilding narrative, but paid lip service to the 
peacebuilding narrative to deflect criticism from western donors. Rajapaksa used elections in 
the east and the north to forestall and deflect international criticism of the government, 
particularly in response to impending United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) 
deadlines.
30
 Holding the Eastern Provincial Council elections in 2008 signalled the transition 
from military occupation towards an inclusive political settlement, which had the backing of 
local populations and was supportive of local development needs. The EPC also provided 
opportunities for the central government to buy-in local powerholders and to legitimise their 
alliances with allies like the TMVP.  
Therefore the PC system served a variety of interests: it provided international players and 
particularly India, with a useful mechanism for demonstrating tangible progress in addressing 
conflict-related issues to the Indian public. The PCs also opened a space for local actors 
including paramilitary groups such as the TMVP to consolidate their power by, for example, 
making a transition from military to political actors. 
 
Political brokerage through and alongside the EPC 
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Political brokerage does not only evolve within the official decentralised architecture, but 
typically establishes connections and affinities that extend beyond these formal arenas. Other 
studies of religious brokers and civil servants in eastern Sri Lanka have highlighted that while 
the political space carved out by some brokers may contract during war time, it often expands 
for others.
31
 The three vignettes elaborated below illustrate the contrasting forms of 
brokerage surrounding the politics of the EPC, and demonstrate the crucial role these figures 
perform in straddling diverse layers of governance and reconciling conflicting agendas.  
 
Pillayan: from rebel to political chief 
 
Pillayan‟s unlikely rise to power started with a boundary crossing, literally and 
metaphorically -- in 1991 he crossed the Valaichenai River, venturing into the „uncleared‟ 
area of Vaharai to join the LTTE. He was an unlikely recruit; he was physically small and, 
unlike his classmates, had kept a distance from militant groups until then. In contrast to 
Karuna, the man he was to later displace, he had a relatively lowly position in the political 
wing of Batticaloa. Even by the time of the 2004 split with the LTTE, there were five higher-
ranking members between him and Karuna. Yet, he managed to leap frog over them and 
usurp the leader in 2007– according to Sánchez Meertens (2013) because of control over 
information, participation in resource distribution and external contacts.  
 
In many respects, his career gets swept along by wider events. After the de-merger of the 
northern and Eastern Province and the ousting the LTTE from the east, the first ever elections 
of the EPC are held in 2008. The Rajapaksa government seeks to consolidate its military 
success and manages to secure a majority by promising Tamil, Muslim and Sinhala leaders 
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the Chief Minister position. To the consternation of the Muslim electorate, Pillayan gets the 
post after sweeping the Tamil vote on a shared ticket with the Rajapaksa government. As 
Chief Minister, Pillayan plays a symbolically significant role, but achieves little. His 
popularity dwindles and the subsequent provincial elections of 2012 result in a landslide 
defeat. He is replaced by a Muslim politician and promoted into irrelevance as a presidential 
advisor. Pillayan‟s fall from grace is confirmed when the Rajapaksa government is defeated 
in presidential and then parliamentary elections in 2015, thus removing his source of funding 
and protection. In October that year, he is arrested on allegations of a murder committed 
during the bloodletting associated with the first split. 
 
Pillayan‟s utility as a broker was very context specific and time bound. The Rajapaksa 
government first deployed the TMVP as military proxies in an unruly frontier. Then, in the 
aftermath of its military success, Pillayan represented a more malleable broker than Karuna, 
but could at the same time provide a gloss of democratic legitimacy to the EPC. 
He was thus absorbed into government through a key position, but cut off from major 
political resources: the legislative power of the EPC was deeply constrained and the bulk of 
government largess was channelled outside the Council, through characters like 
Punchinilame (below). Pillayan was finally discarded when his utility expired. His rise and 
fall were thus driven by a constellation of forces well beyond his control. 
 
However, his ability to survive this sequence of events, demonstrates remarkable agility, and 
a large portion of luck. After all, most of his fellow cadres did not make it through this 
turbulent transition with any success. Many were killed, either in the wake of the Karuna split 
or in the final phase of the war. Those who survived were forcibly demobilised, humiliated 
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and indoctrinated. Pillayan staged an electoral campaign and managed to hold out for four 
years in a deeply unstable political landscape. 
 
Remarkably, many of the people we interviewed when he was Chief Minister, were 
somewhat understanding of his predicament. While Pillayan was in office, the central 
government effected a range of interventions that caused concern among Tamils and Muslims 
alike. There was deep anxiety about post-war militarisation of public life, land-grabbing 
under the guise of Buddhist sites, military camps or development projects and shifting ethnic 
demography through the arrival of Sinhala farmers and gerrymandering. “Pillayan makes 
statements about the plight of the Tamil people,” a Tamil church leader told us. “He sees 
what is happening in the east. But he can‟t oppose this openly…He can‟t do much, but he 
will hold on.” Informants tended to direct their anger towards the government rather than 
Pillayan; a Tamil civil servant told us: “It is not about the Chief Minister. Whoever becomes 
the Chief Minister, no one can do anything. Pillayan is very good with the eastern people, but 
he can‟t do much. He is a good man.”  
 
Evidently, this apparent sympathy did not translate into electoral success. Pillayan‟s victory 
at the 2008 polls emerged out of a peculiar constellation of adversaries – Pillayan along with 
a range of established Muslim and Sinhala strongmen – competing for votes under a 
government umbrella, with virtually no credible opposition candidates. This was different 
when the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) joined the race during the elections of 2010 
(Parliament) and 2012 (EPC). In both cases, the TMVP was wiped out except in a few small 
pockets of Batticaloa District. Pillayan had tried to nurture a political community primarily 
based on a regional eastern Tamil identity. His statements were more conciliatory than those 
of the TNA, and the iconography of the TMVP replaced rifles and bullets with rice, sunrays, 
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handshakes as well as religious (Christian and Hindu) references.
32
 He sought to gain a 
foothold in a post-war Tamil political arena, but his political project ultimately failed to gain 
much traction. The more militant repertoire of the TNA prevailed.  
 
Pillayan‟s experience illustrates how the fortunes of frontier brokers can fluctuate rapidly in 
post-war environments, as they seek to exploit opportunities provided by the changing 
dynamics on the ground, and as the goals of the political centre shift. The TMVP performed a 
short-term function for the regime of stabilising the region and helping to legitimise their 
rule, but these benefits diminished as the Rajapaksa government‟s military and political 
control over the region was consolidated. This opened up the opportunity for new forms of 
brokerage, which brings us to our next case, Punchinilame.  
 
Punchinilame: from small town politician to viceroy  
 
Local roots are a key source of political capital for elected leaders in eastern Sri Lanka. 
Almost all politicians, from local councils all the way up to parliament rely on an ethnic bloc 
vote from their home constituency. In light of this, Susantha Punchinilame is a highly unusual 
politician in eastern Sri Lanka. As a Sinhala United National Party (UNP) leader from 
Ratnapura (in the southwest) with a rather chequered history he appeared an unlikely 
candidate to mobilise voters in the ethnicised political landscape of the Eastern Province. 
Nonetheless he became one of the region‟s primary political leaders and like Pillayan, the 
combination of brokering skills and his political utility for the government, helps account for 
his rise. 
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When Punchinilame was parachuted into the east, few people had heard of him and those 
who had remembered that he was once suspected of murdering a rival politician in 
Ratnapura.
33
 “He has a bad character,” a council member of the EPC told us. Having 
switched party and region, Punchinilame became the minister responsible for the Eastern 
Province under the Nation-Building Ministry, the primary patronage distribution network, 
headed by Basil Rajapaksa (the president‟s brother). Although the inner workings of the 
ministry were opaque, everybody knew this was where political power was concentrated and 
resources flowed. And soon, pretty much everybody in the east knew Punchinilame was the 
man to go to. His name translates as “little sir” in Sinhala, which seemed to suit the small 
man with a moustache who acted like a viceroy under the tutelage of the ruling Rajapaksa 
family. 
 
Punchinilame was known to drive around the remote corners of the Eastern Province with his 
impressive motorcade of 4-wheel drives and police escorts to fix people‟s problems on the 
spot. A senior Muslim community leader from Ampara District observed that, “Punchinilame 
was familiarizing himself with the region and he came to visit me. When he left he said: „Oh 
your road is not in good shape. You need a nicer one.‟ And in seven days — seven days! — 
we had a tarmac road. After all those years of asking our own politicians at the Pradeshiya 
Sabha!” Punchinilame performed miracles with a flick of his finger or a quick chat on his cell 
phone. “People were unhappy with the OIC [the Officer in Charge, the local head of police 
and a very powerful figure],” a Muslim community leader from Trincomalee District added. 
“They hated him and told Punchinilame. He replaced him on the spot.”34 His political 
potency was also linked to thuggery, intimidation, and cunning manoeuvres. Another 
interviewee from a poor rural village in the east noted that, “if we don‟t vote for him, he may 
give us trouble”.  
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His political powers were shown to full effect during the first parliamentary elections after 
the war, in 2010. As an “imported politician” running in a district (Trincomalee) where all his 
contenders had a clear home advantage, many thought he would not be able to mobilise 
sufficient electoral power. Moreover, the elections were seen as an opportunity to 
demonstrate the unpopularity of the government among Tamil and Muslim voters. But within 
a few weeks of campaigning, the contours of Punchinilame‟s victory were starting to emerge. 
Organisers from rival parties or candidates gave in to the pressure and joined him. 
Underserved Tamil and Muslim constituencies, who were disappointed by the relative 
impotence of their own leaders, swayed. Many thought there was little point opposing the 
government and from their perspective forging ties with the Punchinilame, who had a direct 
line to Basil Rajapaksa, seemed like the smartest thing to do. After all, no politician could 
really be trusted, but Punchinilame was at least hard working, politically skilled, and 
provided the most credible access to government patronage. A retired civil servant told us: 
“He [Punchinilame] is very shrewd. He talks like „machang‟ [a slang word, similar to 
„mate‟]. He is a man of close contacts. The people in Trincomalee are experiencing a new 
kind of politics. Susantha is not a good politician, but he knows his art.” 
 
After his victory in the 2010 elections in Trincomalee Punchinilame continued to be a major 
force there in the years to follow. He provides a fascinating parallel to Pillayan. Both have 
violent pasts, and both emerge as brokers in moments of rupture during the post war period. 
Pilliyan is Tamil and local; Punchinilame Sinhala and imported. Pillayan managed to muster 
a level of sympathy, but little political potency; the reverse was true for Punchinilame. Both 
these political figures thrived because they provided a form of brokerage that was politically 
expedient for the government; arguably Punchinilame was attractive because of his capacity 
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for political mobilisation, whilst one of Pillayan‟s main assets was precisely his limited 
powers and room for manoeuvre.  Both fulfilled a central role in the Rajapaksa 
administration‟s drive to rule the east following the removal the LTTE. They enabled the 
government to manage post-war democratic forces with tokenistic forms of representation 
and ample flows of largesse. Pillayan‟s role was to act as a figurehead and to prevent the 
Provincial Council from taking an overly activist stance – in other words he served to 
moderate centrifugal forces and in this sense he laid the ground for Punchinilame, whose role 
was to strengthen centripetal forces, by forging direct political and economic ties between the 
regime and constituencies in the east.  
 
Abdullah: local leader, chameleon and survivor  
 
The contradictions between the centripetal and centrifugal political forces manifests itself in 
tangible ways for those engaged in politics in eastern Sri Lanka. This becomes very clear 
when we look at political leaders who represent their people in the provincial or local council, 
but whose constituencies are too insignificant to scale up. Particularly in the Muslim 
community this leads to some irreconcilable tensions. People expect their leaders to voice 
their concerns and make claims on the state, but at the same time, leaders need to be able to 
access to the government‟s political machinery so as to ensure a flow of resources and 
services to their constituency. This leads to a rather schizophrenic politics of trying to act 
against the same forces one is making overtures to. This requires a kind of brokerage that 
does not simply straddle difference, but grapples with oppositional forces – or to draw on 
Hirschman, they have to exercise „voice‟ and „loyalty‟ at the same time. 
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The case of a local council leader in one of eastern Sri Lanka‟s Muslim pockets, a man we 
will call Abdullah, is illustrative of this challenge. Abdullah‟s political career was marked by 
this need to jockey for position. He had survived as a supporter of the main Muslim party 
(SLMC), while running for either mainstream party (UNP, SLFP) and forging ties with key 
politicians of pretty much all colours. Throughout this history of changing sides, several 
factions had sought to gain access to his constituency, either by making him promises, or by 
intimidating him with subtle threats, or fabricated police charges.  
 
According to Abdullah, after the defeat of the LTTE, most people in his town were deeply 
dissatisfied with the Rajapaksa government. Apart from the corruption, family nepotism and 
the rising cost of living, they were particularly worried about land. A Buddhist monk had 
arrived to lay claims on large swaths of paddy land for sacred sites and the military was 
cordoning off land for security reasons. When Abdullah was chairman of the local council 
(Pradeshiya Sabha), he was forced to sign the paperwork endorsing some of the land deals. 
People higher up told him “this goes above you, you have to sign”. Particularly for leaders 
who sided with the opposition, it was difficult to resist such pressure. “In the opposition, we 
can‟t oppose the government,” Abdullah explained. “If they go against us and we are in the 
government, maybe we can do something.” Moreover, he added, “if you are with the 
government, they will reward you. The Nation Building Ministry, for example, will bypass 
all and fund the Pradeshiya Sabha directly.”  
 
When we visited him a few years later, Abdullah had aligned himself with Punchinilame, but 
his constituency was raising increasingly vocal alarm about post-war land tussles. More 
Muslim farmers had been evicted by the military and the tussles over designated sacred land 
were coming to a head. People were trying to get their voices heard, Abdullah explained, but 
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the EPC could do little  for them. In fact, one of Pillayan‟s relatives was affected by the land 
struggles in Abdullah‟s constituency, but even the Chief Minister could not stop it. With local 
elections going on in the neighbouring district, Abdullah found himself reluctantly 
campaigning for the government on one side of the border, while leading a protest against 
government land grabbing in his own town. During the protest, he and his fellow Muslim 
leaders had been arrested and then released on bail. The ensuing court case would 
momentarily stall the contested land claims, but also left them vulnerable to government 
pressure. 
 
In the week following his release Abdullah invited us to his house. Sat in a circle of his 
reception room we listened to a sequence of testimonies dominated by the post-war 
grievances of the local Muslim community. Another local politician briefed us about the 
different sites that were being taken. The ulama leader explained about the increasingly anti-
Muslim sentiment that the government was fuelling; Muslim protesters needed to avoid 
violent escalation at all cost, because this could unleash Sinhala mobs. And several Muslim 
farmers told us in some detail about their eviction.  
 
And then, just as they were discussing whether to appeal to senior Muslim politicians 
elsewhere in the country, there was a remarkable shift. From the front yard, one of the boys 
hanging around the house came rushing in whispering in an alarmed voice “minister, 
minister, minister!” What followed was the political version of a fire drill. The entire group 
made its way into the private quarters and out the back door. The domestic worker came by 
the tables to collect all the teacups, the glasses and the snacks; he lifted the tablecloth to 
shake the crumbs off and replaced it. In the meantime, Abdullah moved out the front door to 
welcome his unexpected guest Susantha Punchinilame, and when he came in, all he saw were 
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the foreign guests having a cup of tea. What happened in that half minute was like the quick 
closing of the curtain between two scenes with a different cast and a different dialogue. Exit 
disgruntled Muslims, enter the government „viceroy‟, with Abdullah (and his foreign guests) 
as the point of continuity.   
 
A polite conversational game of chess followed, with carefully fielded questions and friendly, 
but somewhat evasive answers. Development efforts after the war had indeed made 
significant progress. A hint at the minister‟s impressive political career elicited some false 
modesty about his role. Many people had come to like him, because he really worked for the 
people. He was in direct contact with Basil Rajapaksa who had empowered him to reach 
down to every village with the necessary support. And yes, there were some unfortunate 
contentions around land. These were highly complex matters for which a solution would have 
to be found. Sri Lanka after all was an ancient country (a subtle reference to the glorious 
history of the Sinhala civilisation) and the sentiments of the majority needed to be reckoned 
with, but surely there was a way to resolve these issues amicably and reach a compromise. 
What he meant by compromise was clearly not some sort of power sharing between the 
central government and the EPC on crucial issues like land and law enforcement. Rather it 
would involve promoting the vision of Mahinda Rajapaksa, thus leaving behind ethnic 
antagonisms and pursuing harmonious development. Why could Sinhala farmers not come to 
this region, just like Tamils and Muslims could move to Colombo? Abdullah just nodded 
silently.  
 
Brokers and boundaries in transition 
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The varied forms and functions of brokerage exhibited in these three cases are summarised in 
Table 1.  
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
The first two brokers – Pillayan and Punchinilame – were among the most powerful players 
in the east during the period studied. Both started their political careers as „embedded 
brokers‟ who metamorphosised into „representative brokers‟. Both moved in – though they 
came from very different starting points -- to hold government ground in the post-war 
frontier. Pillayan was a weak renegade who temporarily occupied a crucial political synapse: 
a non-LTTE Tamil space. He delivered a Tamil-led EPC that did not cause any trouble, and 
in so doing opened up the space for a different kind of broker in the form of Punchinilame, a 
political strongman whose role was to extend and consolidate a patronage structure that 
bypassed the formal institutions of decentralised governance. By instilling loyalty and by 
providing material inducements, he took the wind out of the sails of the EPC and other 
potential challengers of the government, and fractured vote banks with adversarial potential. 
Both brokers grasped the opportunity to have a new lease of life. Both needed to cross some 
contentious boundaries and reinvent themselves in order to survive. Pillayan crossed the most 
fundamental boundary of all, that between „friend‟ and „foe‟ when he left the LTTE, and 
joined his former enemy the Rajapaksa government. Punchinilame was deployed as a 
political pioneer tasked to establish a base in a political territory that was alien to him, by 
reinventing himself as a district benefactor.  
 
Abdullah, finally, is a different kind of broker. He is a classical „embedded broker‟ -- rather 
than moving around, he stays put. For him, brokerage represents a career choice, rather than a 
transitional phase. His local legitimacy and his utility for those higher up depends on his ties 
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to his constituency in the east and his ability to mobilise a Muslim vote bank. He straddles 
divides by engaging with oppositional forces, and deploying different repertoires in different 
spaces; campaigning for the government in one district, demonstrating against it in another; 
echoing the anxieties of his people in public, wheeling and dealing with political networks in 
private. Managing these contradictions, and keeping them in tension, is essential to his 
political survival, and this becomes most challenging when two spaces overlap – for example 
when a government minister walks in through your front door.  
 
By 2016, there was a new coalition government in power, with Maithripala Siresena (SLFP) 
as President and Ranil Wickermasinghe (UNP) as Prime Minister. The two key election 
promises were „good governance‟ („yahapalayanaya‟) and state reform by getting rid of the 
executive presidency and devolving powers to the provinces. As for our three brokers, 
Pillayan had been arrested, Punchinilame was hanging on, and Abdullah was still 
counstruggling with the everyday contradictions of being a Muslim leader in eastern Sri 
Lanka.  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
Accounts of post-war transitions and peacebuilding that only focus on the formal institutions 
miss a great deal about how these structures are embedded within the political marketplace 
and wider society. We have argued that processes of decentralisation produce new arenas of 
conflict and that to understand these, we need to pay close attention to the interplay between 
formal institutional structures and the individual brokers that weave in and out of them. The 
EPC became a key arena for pursuing and reconciling post-war struggles between contending 
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political forces at the centre and periphery, but these dynamics were heavily mediated by 
brokers like Pillayan, Punchinalame and Abdullah. These characters operated in a particular 
constellation of constraint and opportunity; the dynamics of state expansion and 
consolidation described here are specific to the frontier, and are marked by contests over the 
re-drawing and transgression of boundaries. The Rajapaksa government‟s attempt to re-
activate the Provincial Council system after the war represents one highly visible attempt to 
re-fashion political boundaries and territorialise power. But frontier brokers were also deeply 
involved in these processes, which can be discerned in the TMVP‟s nascent attempts to build 
a new political community for eastern Tamils, or in Abdullah‟s fraught attempts to straddle 
and reconcile the competing demands placed on him by agents of the state like Punchinilame 
and his core Muslim constituency.  
In explaining the manoeuvring of these brokers, we may distinguish elements of Hirschman‟s 
exit, voice and loyalty.
35
 Exit, in the form of fighting for a separate state, and then 
subsequently leaving the movement (Pillayan); Voice in relation to Abdullah‟s struggles to 
get his constituencies‟ grievances heard. But also Pillayan‟s unsuccessful attempt to create a 
platform for an eastern Tamil political community (a career trajectory that moved from exit, 
to voice and then loyalty). And finally Punchinilame most clearly exemplifies loyalty as one 
of the Rajapaksa‟s trusted agents in the east. Pillayan‟s loyalty to that government always 
remained unstable. And for Abdullah it is clear that loyalty must always be plural, contingent 
and transient to grapple with the contradictions of his political project. 
These career paths raise questions about the autonomy and agency of frontier brokers – 
whether they simply follow the scripts set for them by more powerful players and wider 
structural forces, or whether they have a degree of „context freedom‟– in other words is this a 
story of path dependency or path shaping? Our study suggests that this is very time dependent 
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– during moments of rupture, or when frontiers are re-opening, brokers appear to have much 
great autonomy, than when frontiers are closing and they are being incorporated into central 
state structures. Few would argue that either of these three characters deserves more than a 
footnote in Sri Lanka‟s history of statebuilding and civil war. And yet, they each played a 
role both in supporting the Rajapaksa government‟s plans for the east and in negotiating their 
outcomes. The eastern margins played a constitutive role in ending the war and shaping the 
post-war political settlement and served as important zones of experimentation and 
incubators of change.  
Each of our three brokers have rather idiosyncratic career trajectories, but at the same time 
their biographies are intertwined with, and helped shape wider events related to changing 
frontier dynamics, the demise of the LTTE and reconfiguration of the political constellation 
in the vacuum they left behind. This frontier story of oscillating power and opening and 
closing frontiers might be told in five chapters.  
During the first chapter (the relative equilibrium prior to the 2002 ceasefire) the northeastern 
frontier became a zone of non-state or anti state administrative experimentation. At this time, 
the Provincial Council was a frozen entity overshadowed by various forms of military 
governance. Pillayan is a junior cadre, Punchinilame a small town Sinhala politician in the 
South, and Abdullah jockeyed for position between the various competing political forces. 
The second chapter (destabilisation following the ceasefire) saw the emergence of the TMVP. 
And paradoxically the re-scaling of the Tamil national imaginary – from Tamil nationalism, 
to localism – opened up the periphery to the forces of centralism and Sinhala nationalism. 
The split enabled firstly the state to regain and strengthen its foothold in the east, a process 
also supported by the de-merging on the EPC and NPC. The east became a laboratory for 
rolling out a programme of securitized development and controlled democratisation. Brokers 
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like Punchinilame were brought in as viceroys to secure political turf for the government. The 
latter was less about local government than local governance – brokers were critical nodes in 
rhizomic networks that underpinned or subverted the formal façade of the EPC. This does not 
mean the EPC was irrelevant; it was necessary to get important constituencies (international, 
Tamil and Muslim) on board, but its primary value was symbolic.  
The third chapter was precipitated by the defeat of the LTTE – which the TMVP aided 
through their intelligence and deployment of cadres in the north. Punchinilame entrenches his 
position in the east, while Pillayan‟s lease of political life is running out. Unable to mobilize a 
solid vote bank, his utility to the government declines and he is replaced by a Muslim broker 
loyal to the government. In many respects, Abdullah, as a small-town politician, constitutes a 
point of continuity that persists throughout the transition; changing all the time, but keeping 
things relatively the same. Abdullah had to manoeuvre carefully when the LTTE ruled the 
areas around his town and repositioned himself when either of Sri Lanka‟s mainstream 
parties replaced the other. It is these chameleon-like qualities that enabled him to stay in the 
game. This reminds us that decentralisation and institutional reform may not produce the 
imagined results. After all, there are many small-town brokers like Abdullah, who occupy the 
synapses between centre and periphery and are simultaneously the connective tissue and 
point of friction within the system. Although Abdullah was Janus-faced, ultimately he sided 
with his community when their land was being taken, even though this jeopardised his career 
as a broker.  
In the fourth chapter, the margins started to „invade‟ the centre, in the sense that modes of 
governing and disciplinary powers that were deployed in the north and east, were 
increasingly applied to the body politic in the South – including growing surveillance of the 
population, arrests and intimidation of civil society.
36
 This suggests that the margins offer a 
This is the accepted version of Jonathan Goodhand, Bart Klem & Oliver Walton (2017) ‘Mediating the margins: the role 
of brokers and the Eastern Provincial Councils in Sri Lanka’s post-war transition’ Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal. 
Published version available from Taylor & Francis at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23802014.2016.1302816 
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23788/   
 
32 
 
unique perspective on the state, not because they are exotic, but because the margins 
represent „a necessary curtailment of the state, much as the exception is a necessary 
component of the rule‟.37 Of course there is now a fifth chapter, which is being played out at 
the time of writing. Arguably it was the modes of frontier governance that were transferred 
and applied at the centre that generated the grievances in the Sinhala polity that led to the 
regime‟s crisis of legitimacy and its final fall from power. A more inclusive political 
settlement in which power is more dispersed and negotiated has opened up the space for 
dialogue on constitutional reform and perhaps a renegotiation of centre periphery relations. 
And perhaps, for the first time in its history, the EPC may emerge as a genuine political 
platform for articulating the region‟s grievances or experimenting with Muslim-Tamil 
cooperation. The story ends less well for our two power-brokers. Pillayan is in prison, whilst 
Punchinilame‟s role as a de facto viceroy declined significantly. Abdullah though remains in 
the game. None of these three brokers can claim a central role in this bigger story, but they 
were certainly unwitting players and their life histories deserve to be studied more closely. 
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